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I. THEMES
I have adapted the title for my thoughts from an unlikely source. In
1932, the French composer Olivier Messiaen created "Apparition de l'Eglise
eternelle" (Vision of the Eternal Church) for pipe organ. The piece begins
tentatively, quietly announcing its theme using only a small part of the
instrument's potential. It carefully adds other voices, relentlessly building to
full organ in both volume and timbre. Unified by the keyboard, many voices
speak as a mystical whole, announcing the future fulfillment of human
potential.
Messiaen's musical vision offers several themes for our reflection. The
first, and perhaps the most easily imagined, I will call "market crescendo."
Encouraged by external market forces and its own internal structure, the small
law firm grows bigger and the large law firm expands to megaproportions.
We are now witnessing the result of such a market-inspired crescendo. Like
Messiaen's vision, market crescendo is "very simple, almost brutal at its
climax. Established slowly, it will take a long time to disappear." 1 Similar-
ly, I believe that the current market crescendo will eventually climax (if it
'Anderson-Fomoff Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law.
B.A. 1969, St. Olaf College; J.D. 1974, Marquette University. Research support for this article
was provided by an endowment funded by Eugene N. Balk and The Anderson Group.
1. OLIVER MESSIAEN, MESSIAEN ON MESSIAEN: THE COMPOSER WRITES ABOUT His
WORKS 4 (Irene Feddem trans., 1986).
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hasn't already). Law firms have grown and may continue growing, especially
if they can establish safeguards to manage conflicts of interest.
Messiaen's music next suggests two possible outcomes for future law
firms. First, the market crescendo may be followed by a "regulatory
cacophony" designed to control the harmful effects of.conflicts of interest.
The regulatory safeguards currently most touted by the bar, so-called "Chinese
Walls," may then proliferate as they have in other businesses such as
investment banking. As this occurs, lawyers will need to reevaluate the
additional costs of doing business in large 'firms in a heavily regulated
environment.
Messiaen's vision does not end with its climactic crescendo, however.
Rather, "a decrescendo equally progressive"2 follows, lasting until the end of
the piece. Similarly, a clash between market crescendo and regulatory
cacophony may be followed by regulatory complexity as well as by a
reconsideration of law firm structure and size. I will call this theme "ethical
reprise." If courts or law firms decide that screens inadequately respond to
professional obligations, the future shape of law practice may resemble
Messiaen's progressive decrescendo.
II. MARKET CRESCENDO
There can be no doubt that law firms have grown in size and complexity
during the past century. Although commentators differ in explaining exactly
why this has occurred, at least two major factors have played a part. First,
external market forces that affect all businesses have also encouraged law firm
growth. Second, the internal structures of some law firms have added
pressure toward expansion as well.
A. External Market Forces
Perhaps the most significant external forces are the national and interna-
tional economies. Both have grown dramatically in size and complexity since
World War II.3 Law firms offering services in a dynamic economy often face
opportunities for increased revenues that they can exploit only by adding
additional lawyers to serve new demand.
The volume of legal services has tripled since 1970.1 At the same time,
another factor, the increasing complexity of legal regulation, has added to the
2. Id.
3. MARc GALANTER & THoMAs PALAY, TouRNAiENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 38, 115 (1991).
4. Id. at 112 (citing Richard Sander & Douglas Williams, Why Are There So Many
Lawyers?: Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 431, 435 (1989)).
[Vol. 45:937
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demand for corporate legal services. Business in general has developed
international complexity in a domestic legal system replete with new
environmental, economic, and workplace regulation.5
The increasingly complex web of legal regulation that surrounds modern
business may also have accelerated the proliferation of in-house counsel, who
perform routine tasks and counseling functions formerly farmed to outside
firms. In-house lawyers today shop for value and quality in outside counsel,
often shifting only complex and specialized work to outside firms.6
Exponential growth in the legal-services market over the past twenty-five
years parallels exponential growth in the number of lawyers. The number of
students graduated by the nation's law schools has tripled since 1960, making
available a large number of new lawyers willing to market their services in an
increasingly complex world. A disproportionate number of these lawyers have
been swallowed up by growing law firms serving corporate clients. 8
As lawyers have grown in number, their organizations, whether law firms
or government offices, have followed suit. The identity of clients has also
been transformed from individuals or small groups to large entities. Indeed,
most large-firm clients today are corporations, partnerships, private associa-
tions, or government agencies. Over time, these groups, like their lawyers,
merge, diversify, and grow. All of these trends result in an increasingly fluid
legal-services market.
Large-firm lawyers today must come to grips not only with exponential
increases in firm size but with the increasingly competitive world of providing
corporate legal services. These structural pressures push lawyers toward
finding more work to replace that lost to in-house lawyers or competitive
outsiders.
Recent evidence suggests that the market crescendo may have peaked. In
the last year, forty-eight percent of the 250 largest law firms have lost, rather
than gained, lawyers.9 Overall, however, the number of law firms with more
than 100 lawyers continues to grow-up from 79 in the year 197810 to over
5. See id. at 115.
6. See id. at 49-50, 113-14; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the
Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split
Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313, 382 (1985).
7. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 3, at 110 (1991).
8. Id. at40, 110-11.
9. Thorn Weidlich, The Legal Field Sees a Glimmer of Recovery, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 27,
1993, at S2. In the previous year, 64% of the largest law firms lost attorneys. Kenneth Rutman
& Carol M. Neal, The 15th Survey Boasts a Leaner, Meaner Field, NAT'L L.J, Sept. 28, 1992,
at S2, S3.
10. See The NI 250: A Special 5-Year Report on the Dramatic Growth of the Nation's
Largest Law Firms, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 19, 1983, special insert, at 1, 1.
19941
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250 today.1"
B. Internal Structural Responses
Palay and Galanter point out that the incentive structure of large law firms
promotes a "tournament of lawyers" hungry for partnership.' Each new
partner necessitates additional associates to serve the clients generated by the
partner's "shareable human capital," or ability to delegate some aspects of the
client's legal work to others. Assuming a constant associate-to-partner ratio,
each new partner adds exponentially to the size of a firm.13 This account of
law firm growth depends, however, on two assumptions: (1) that each partner
possesses "surplus shareable human capital," and (2) that the firm fixes and
does not decrease the percentage of associates who eventually win the
tournament and become partners. 4
Palay and Galanter describe the human capital of some partners as "highly
idiosyncratic," 5 which limits their ability to lend work to associates.
Similarly, firms whose partners possess "just enough reputation, client
relationships, skills, and experience to support themselves" 6 will have little
need for associates at all. Firms with partners that can share surplus human
capital vAil also remain stable in size if they rarely promote associates. But
as these employees develop their own skills, they have little incentive to stay
with the firm absent the partnership option, and the likelihood of their
departure increases.'
7
The internal-governance structure of a law firm thus depends on the
individual skills of its partners and the extent to which they can create
incentives for promotion. External market forces offer a firm the opportunity
for growth; a firm's internal structure reflects its ability and willingness to
respond.
C. Consequences
Increased size brings opportunities for increased wealth, but it also
multiplies the potential for problems. Beyond the economic realities of finding
and keeping business, lawyers increasingly are confronting ethical dilemmas
generated by law firm growth. As a firm expands and the number of its
11. See Weidlich, supra note 9, at S5-S26.
12. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 3, at 100-02.
13. See id. at 103.
14. See id. at 107.
15. Id. at 109.
16. Id.
17. Id.
[Vol. 45:937
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 5 [1993], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss5/11
LAW FIRM CONFLICTS SCREENS
clients and matters increases, the potential that a client may have an interest
adverse to another current or former client grows as well. 1
A firm confronting a conflict of interest faces two distinct ethical
problems. First, it must be alert to and remedy loyalty conflicts caused by
simultaneous representation of two or more clients with adverse interests.
Because all firm lawyers share an equal fiduciary duty to all clients, any client
who does not consent to a loyalty conflict of interest can limit the law firm's
ability to represent others.9 If the number of clients increases as a law firm
expands, the potential for conflicts between simultaneously represented clients
also increases.
Absent client consent, the firm may solve a loyalty conflict only by
ceasing its representation of all conflicting clients." To encourage clients to
consent to a loyalty conflict, a firm may promise a screen barring the attorneys
who represent the conflicting clients from communicating with one another.
In nonlitigation matters, potentially adverse clients who are willing to assume
a large degree of responsibility for the representation and to actively manage
the conflict may consent to common representation.2 Absent this circum-
stance, screens are not adequate safeguards in conflicts between current
clients.22
A firm cannot solve a concurrent-client conflict by choosing one client
and ceasing representation of the other. When a firm ceases representation of
all but one conflicting client, it then faces a second ethical problem. Lawyers
and firms owe clients a duty of confidentiality as well as a duty of loyalty.
This duty to respect confidences, like the loyalty obligation, is borne by the
entire firm. Unlike the loyalty duty, however, the duty of confidentiality
continues indefinitely beyond the end of the representation of the client.' A
firm that ceases representation of a client thus remains obligated not to use
against that client any confidences gained during the course of the representa-
tion. Since a disclosure by any former client to one lawyer in the firm could
have been shared with other lawyers, the entire firm faces the almost
insurmountable dilemma of proving that it has not used, and cannot use, the
confidences of a former client against that client if the firm seeks to represent
18. Lloyd N. Cutler, The Role of the Private Law Firm, 33 Bus. LAW. 1549, 1549 (1978);
William H. Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, Address at the Commemoration of the
Indiana University School of Law Library Building, in 62 IND. L.J. 151, 155 (1987).
19. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.10 (1993); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNSmILrrY DR 5-105 (1983).
20. See, e.g., Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
21. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUT Rule 2.2 (1993).
22. See International Business Machines Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978);
Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 232-33 (2d Cir.), aff'g in part
and rev'g in part 435 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
23. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.7.2, at 298 (Student ed. 1986).
19941
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an adversary in the same, or in a substantially related,' matter. This
analysis also would apply if representation of the first client ceased before the
second client approached the law firm.
Conflicts of this sort between former and current clients arise when either
a client?' or lawyer' changes law firms. A lawyer joining a new firm can
taint the new firm by bringing information about former clients from her past
practices. Both lawyer and client moves are more likely to create conflicts in
small towns or in specialized practices, such as patent law, for which the
availablity of lawyers may be limited.
Although conflicts generated by former-client representation occur in all
sizes of firms, the vast majority of reported cases involve firms of fifty or
more lawyers.27 Two factors may account for this.
24. See generally id. §§ 7.4.2-.3, at 364-71 (discussing the substantial-relationshiptest under
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 before its 1987 and 1989 amendments).
25. See, e.g., Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hilco, Inc., No. 81-C-419,1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3928, 1988 WL 40871 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 1988).
26. See Graham ex rel. Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 906 F.2d 1419 (10th Cir. 1990), on remand
to 760 F. Supp. 1451 (D. Kan. 1991); Atasi Corp. v. Seagate Technology, 847 F.2d 826 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.
v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'g 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y.
1973); Geisler ex rel. Geisler v. Wyeth Labs., 716 F. Supp. 520 (D. Kan. 1989), remanded, 934
F.2d 326 (10th Cir.) (table decision; opinion available in WESTLAW at 1990 WL 299410), on
remand at 760 F. Supp. 1451 (D. Kan. 1990); Parker v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft,
781 P.2d 1099 (Kan. 1989).
27. Examples of such cases are Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d
222 (6th Cir. 1988), remanding Manning v. Fort Deposit Bank, 619 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Tenn.
1985); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of
Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983); WestinghouseElec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d
1311 (7th Cir.), aff'g in part and rev'g in part Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd.,
448 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ill.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); SLC Ltd. V v. Bradford
Group West, Inc., 147 B.R. 586 (D. Utah 1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 999 F.2d 464
(10th Cir. 1993); Margiotta v. McLaren (In re McLaren), 115 B.R. 922 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1990); Bridge Prods., Inc. v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 58 U.S.L.W. 2733 (N.D. I11. Apr. 30,
1990); In re Davenport Communications Ltd. Partnership, 109 B.R. 362 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa
1990); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Albert D. Seeno Constr. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D.
Cal. 1988); Havoco of America, Ltd., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 3928, 1988 WL at 40871;
General Elec. Co. v. Industra Prods., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Ind. 1988); Huntington v.
Great Western Resources, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Zimmerman v. Duggan, 81
B.R. 296 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Schechter v. Drobny (In re Columbia Realty Assocs., Ltd.), 71 B.R.
804 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987); Haagen-Dazs Co. v. Perche No! Gelato, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 282
(N.D. Cal. 1986); Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Mo.
1985); United States Football League v. National Football League, 605 F. Supp. 1448 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Guthrie Aircraft, Inc. v. Genesee County, 597 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D.N.Y. 1984); INA
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Nalibotsky, 594 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Williams v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Hughes v. Paine, Webber, Jackson
& Curtis, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Il. 1983); Maritrans G.P., Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton &
Scheetz, 573 A.2d 1001 (Pa. 1990).
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First, some large firms became large by merger or by lateral hiring.
Either event causes immediate conflicts issues.' Assuming that loyalty
conflicts can be obviated by ceasing representation of one of the current
clients, the new firm must then turn to the fiduciary problem of confidentiality.
New associates and partners bring with them the confidences of former clients,
some of whom may now be involved as adversaries against one of the new
firm's current clients.
Initially, the laterally hired or merged lawyers do not have any association
with their new firm, which is required to provide the opportunity for sharing
former-client secrets. Large-firm lawyers therefore argue that ethical problems
caused by duties of former-client confidentiality can be addressed with walls
that screen tainted lawyers from participation in adverse matters in the new
firm.29
Former clients who accept this argument can consent to the firm's
continuing representation of a current adversary.3" The former client who
does not consent can move for a court order to disqualify the firm from its
current representation. Courts considering such motions apply what is known
as the "substantial relationship" test." Designed to protect former clients
from having to disclose the very confidences they currently seek to protect
through disqualification, the substantial-relationship test asks whether the past
representation is substantially related, legally or factually, to the current
client's need for legal services. If it is, a presumption arises that the attorney
obtained the former client's confidences and can use them against the former
client." A lawyer can rebut the presumption only if the lawyer can "clearly
and persuasively show that he was not privy to the confidences and secrets of
the client. "" A few courts, however, sometimes deny motions to disqualify
28. Compare Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 847 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1988) (law firms
merged) with In re McLaren, 115 B.R. at 922 (attorney laterally hired). See generally Lauren
Ravkind, Note, ImputedDisqualification?:Law Firm Mergers and the Need for Change, 8 REv.
LrrG. 93 (1988) (analyzing conflict-of-interest issues caused by law firm mergers).
29. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 518 F.2d at 751; Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 771 F.
Supp. 190 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Rockwell Graphics Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., No. 84-C-
6746, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9002, 1991 WL 127592 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 1991); In re Chicago
South Shore & South Bend R.R., 101 B.R. 10 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); State ex rel. Freezer
Servs., Inc. v. Mullen, 458 N.W.2d 245 (Neb. 1990); Rowley v. Waterfront Airways, Inc., 493
N.Y.S.2d 828 (App. Div. 1985).
30. See Celanese Corp. v. Leesona Corp. (In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig.), 530
F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1976); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(b)-(c) (1993).
31. The substantial-relationship test was first articulated in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265,268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). A modem version may be found
in MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 & cmt. (1993).
32. See, e.g., English Feedlot, Inc. v. Norden Labs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1498, 1506 (D.
Colo. 1993).
33. See, e.g., LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1983).
1994]
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firms even when the matters are substantially related and the lawyer has been
privy to client confidences, ruling that a screen, or Chinese Wall, also rebuts
a presumption that any former-client confidences obtained by a lawyer have
been, or will be, shared with her new firm.34
Litigation about former-client conflicts arises primarily in the context of
large firms for a second reason. Courts have almost never allowed screens in
small (less than ten lawyers)3" or mid-size (ten to twenty lawyers)" firms.
Nearly all screens seriously considered by courts involved law firms with more
than fifty lawyers. Because of this, small firms are probably less likely to
argue for the use of screens.
Large law firms therefore face a dual reality. On one hand, increased
size brings with it greater potential for current- and former-client conflict.
Laterally hired or merged lawyers increase both risks. On the other hand,
screening has emerged in a handful of cases as a remedy to former-client
conflicts that occur in large law firms. Large firms therefore have a basis for
believing that that former-client conflicts can be managed irrespective of the
former client's consent.37
D. Screens in Perspective
Screens of various sorts have been used in a number of industries for at
34. See Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 224 & n. I (6th Cir.
1988), remanding Manning v. Fort Deposit Bank, 619 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Tenn. 1985);
Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, 632 F. Supp. 418, 428 (D. Del. 1986); accord RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYEms § 204 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1991).
35. Research reveals only two cases allowing screens in firms of less than 10 lawyers. The
first, United States ex rel. Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pacific Constr. Corp., 637 F. Supp. 1556
(W.D. Wash. 1986), has been criticized. See Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic
Sys., 809 F. Supp. 1383, 1392 (N.D. Cal. 1992). The second is Geisler ex rel. Geisler v. Wyeth
Labs., 716 F. Supp. 520 (D. Kan. 1989), remanded, 934 F.2d 326 (10th Cir.) (table decision;
opinion available in WESTLAW at 1990 WL 299410), on remand at 760 F. Supp. 1451 (D. Kan.
1990).
36. Only two reported cases allowed screens in firms of 10 to 20 lawyers. In the first,
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the court was
persuaded as much by the former lawyer's peripheral representation as by his new firm's
subsequent screen. See id. at 1577-81. The other, Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, 632 F. Supp.
418 (D. Del. 1986), upheld a screen in a 16-lawyer firm. At least one commentator has argued,
however, that the Nemours Foundation result could more easily be justified on the basis of the
peripheral-representation rule as well. See Thomas D. Morgan, Screening the Disqualifled
Lawyer: The Wrong Solution to the Wrong Problem, 10 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 37, 53
(1987-88).
37. See generally M. Peter Moser, Chinese Walls: A Means of Avoiding Law Firm
Disqualifcation When a PersonallyDisqualifiedLawyer Joins the Firm, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
399 (1990) (supporting the increased use of Chinese Walls to allow representation over the
objections of former clients); Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 677 (1980).
[Vol. 45:937
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 5 [1993], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss5/11
LAW FIRM CONFLICTS SCREENS
least three decades to segregate functions of an institution and thereby limit the
liability exposure of the whole. In particular, securities firms and banks have
responded to conflicts of interest created by the possession of confidential
information with screens designed to prevent part of an institution's operations
from tainting another department's function.
Initially designed as a defense against insider-trading liability, Chinese
Walls first were used successfully by securities brokers to argue that trades
were not based on the communication of information between the investment
banking, research, and sales divisions of their firms.3" These walls, some-
times more accurately referred to as "bamboo curtains,"" bar investment-
banking analysts from giving brokers both obviously improper information,
such as facts learned in investigating financial deals, and less obviously
improper information, such as whether a researcher or analyst is even working
on a particular report for a particular client.'
What was designed twenty-five years ago as a defense against civil
liability has now become a complex operational necessity in securities firms.
In 1990 the Securities and Exchange Commission implemented new standards
requiring all brokerages to establish written policies to prevent insider
trading.41 In 1991 the General Accounting Office reviewed the screens
required by these procedures at eighteen large brokerages and found them
"satisfactory." 42 Less than a year later, however, Shearson Lehman Brothers
agreed to a $500,000 fine for failing to supervise its Chinese Wall procedures.
Shearson had allowed research rating changes to be communicated to
supervisors of trading desks around one-half hour before general dissemination
throughout the firm. Some of the firm's traders apparently saw nothing wrong
using such an early warning to liquidate positions.43
The significant difficulties encountered by securities firms in maintaining
screens are further exacerbated by the use of electronic records of share
transactions. Establishing a bamboo screen that should prevent oral or written
communications between divisions of a firm is one thing, but creating a "wire
fence" in computer systems may prove more difficult.'
38. See James R. Doty & David N. Powers, Chinese Walls: The Transformation of a Good
Business Practice, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 155, 155-56 (1988).
39. See, e.g., Susan Antilla, Stock Picks Plagued by Leaks, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1993, at
Dl, D14.
40. See id.
41. Jayne Levin, GAO Says Brokerage Firms' Chinese Walls 'Satisfactory', INVESTMENT
DEALERS' DIGEsT, Sept. 23, 1991, at 10.
42. Id.
43. See Christina Toh-Pantin, U.S. Brokers' Surveillance System Seen Breachable, Reuters
Fin. Rep., June 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Bankng library, Reufin file.
44. See Practioners [sic] ConcernedAbout Taurus; SystemMay Create Compliance Problems,
THOMSON'S FIN. COMPLIANCE WATCH, May 17, 1991, available in LEXIS, Bankng library,
19941
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Commercial banks are also becoming more frequent users of screens,
establishing them to separate commercial divisions from trust department
operations.45 For example, playing financial advisor to a debtor allows the
bank as creditor to be one of the first aware of a potential bankruptcy.
Separating the functions of financial advisor and credit officer with a screen
appears to offer promise, though some observers express doubt about "how
impermeable the wall is in most cases.""
In addition, banks now manage investment companies while continuing
their traditional lending role. Nonpublic financial information possessed by
a loan department could easily, if communicated, shape a trust department's
advice to its customers. Consequently, the Federal Reserve Board, the OCC,
and the SEC require that the functions be screened from one another.47
European countries are now coming to recognize the necessity of Chinese
Walls in financial institutions as well.48
More recently, screening procedures have been adopted to avoid conflicts
of interest for bankruptcy creditors' committees. 49 In bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion proceedings, large institutional creditors often seek to serve on creditors'
committees, whose function is to restructure the debtor's obligations. A
conflict develops when the debtor is a publicly traded company and the
institutional creditor is also an investment manager for a wide variety of client
accounts, all of which will want to remain free to trade the debtor's securities.
In order to avoid prohibitions against all trades of a debtor's securities while
serving on a creditor's committee, institutional advisors set up screens as
"appropriate information blocking device[s]" 5° designed to prevent traders
from receiving any information from co-employees working with the creditors'
committee. This device of course also necessitates that a person not manage
any investments while serving on a creditors' committee.
Most recently, government contractors are learning that screens may
prevent an "organizational conflict of interest" within the meaning of the
Federal Acquisition Regulations system and the procurement integrity
provisions of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act as well as specific
agency rules.5 These rules prohibit private contractors from entering into
Pubs file.
45. See Edmon W. Blount, Retooling SystemsforReforms Past and Future, A.B.A. BANKING
J., March 1991, at 68, 73.
46. Andrew W. Singer, Morgan Helps Push Client Into Bankruptcy, U.S. BANKER, July,
1992, at 14.
47. See Blount, supra note 45, at 68.
48. See Chinese Walls for Banks, FIN. REG. REP., Nov. 18, 1991.
49. See generally Robert C. Pozen & Judy K. Mencher, Chinese Walls for Creditors'
Committees, 48 Bus. LAW. 747 (1993).
50. In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., No. 1-90-00130,1991 Bankr. LEXIS 288, at *2, 1991
WL 79143, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 1991), quoted in id. at 748.
51. See Thomas J. Madden & James F. Worrall, Identifying and Avoiding Organizational
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management services contracts with government agencies if they currently, or
will in the future, seek other business from the same agency. 2
All of these examples-securities firms, commercial banks, creditor's
committees, and government contractors-share common features. First, the
confidential information in these circumstances is generally obtained in the
course of an arms-length transaction-such as preparing a prospectus or
negotiating a loan agreement, a loan workout, or the terms of a
contract-where the disclosures are necessary to negotiate or carry out the
transaction. Second, because conflict-of-interest problems are inherent in the
nature of the businesses themselves, 3  securities-brokerage, banking,
creditors' committee, and government-contractor walls are permanent,
screening entire departments or divisions from one another.
Despite these similarities, screening barriers in these situations have been
known by a number of different names, including "Chinese Wall," "bamboo
curtain," "wire fence", "screen," and "fire wall." Each of these appellations
evokes a slightly different image: an ancient wall, once impenetrable but now
crumbling; a moving curtain that allows partial but limited view; a metal fence
that blocks large objects but is easily penetrated by smaller things; an opaque
or transparent, stationary or moveable item; or a thick barrier impervious even
to fire. These shades of meaning suggest similar gradations of function, many
of which may allow information to flow through cracks in the barriers.
If similar structures are to succeed in law firms, they must control the
source of conflict by successfully blocking the flow of all confidential
information. In my view, the best image to convey this idea is "fire wall"
because it promises impermeability and strength. Fire walls also can be
opened when they are no longer needed. With these ideas in mind, I will
sketch the future of large firms with such fire walls in place.
M. REGULATORY CACOPHONY
Permanent fire walls in the situations mentioned in the preceding section
are usually required by extensive government regulation, which has led to the
fullest development of fire wall standards to date. Combining the prescriptions
of these regulations with the requirements of the handful of cases that allow
fire walls in law firms affords an- opportunity to speculate about the future
shape of large firms, whose growth could be encouraged further if fire walls
were deemed adequate to prevent leaks of confidential information.
Conflicts of Interest, 58 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at D-26 (Dec. 21, 1992), available in
LEXIS, BNA library, Fdcont file.
52. See id.
53. See generally Alison G. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and
Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REv. 738 (1978) (theorizing that conflicts of interest inevitably
result from specialized exchange).
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A. Internal Structure
The structure of large firms must be geared toward the discovery of
conflicts of interest, which must be detected before prophylactic measures can
be taken. Two sources of information are important: new clients and former
clients. First, each proposed new client for a firm should be identified
adequately by all known names, past and present. This is especially important
for clients that are entities that may have merged or otherwise changed
structure over time. Next, the identities of all potential opposing parties must
be established. Once properly identified, both the prospective client and the
potential opposing parties should be checked against both current and past
client lists of the firm. Any matches deserve further scrutiny. 4
If there is any likelihood that advocacy on behalf of a current client could
disadvantage a potential new client, the firm must seek the consent of both to
the dual representation. If either refuses consent, the firm must decline the
new matter. Proceeding without consent risks sanctions ranging from
disqualification motions15 to disciplinary action 6 to tort liability."
Another problem occurs if the firm rejects its current client in favor of a
potential opponent. Assuming that the current client permits the firm to
withdraw, the firm ceases representation and leaves behind its general duty of
loyalty. The firm retains its confidentiality duty, however, and therefore must
continue to guarantee into the indefimite future that it will not use any
confidences of the prior client against that client. For this reason, all proposed
new clients must be checked against former as well as current clients of the
firm. The firm cannot represent an opponent of a former client without the
former client's consent so long as the two matters are substantially related. 8
The former client may consent either to the use of its confidences in a
current matter or to safeguards such as fire walls to prevent disclosure.
Absent the consent of both the former client and the proposed new client,
54. See Lloyd N. Cutler, Supplemental Remarks to The Role of the Private Law Firm at the
Airlie House Conference on the Ethical Responsibilities of Corporate Lawyers (June 11, 1977),
in 33 Bus. LAW. 1559, 1560-61 (1978); WOLFRAM, supra note 23, § 7.3.4, at 356-57. As a
matter progresses, the law firm must be free to reassess the potential for additional opposing
parties. Prior or current representation of a potential opposing party creates additional conflict
for the firm that owes fiduciary duties to both clients but fears a motion to disqualify if a
currently or formerly represented party is joined. See Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar
& Allen, 849 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1988), remanding Manning v. Fort Deposit Bank, 619 F. Supp.
1327 (W.D. Tenn. 1985); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d
Cir.), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 435 F. Supp 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
55. But see Nathan M. Crystal, Disqualification of Counselfor Unrelated Matter Conflicts of
Interest, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 273 (1990) (arguing against the routine disqualification of
lawyers for unrelated-matter conflicts of interest).
56. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 82-85.
58. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (1993).
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however, the firm faces the same sanctions as it would in a conflict between
current clients: disqualification motions, disciplinary action, and tort liability.
The detection of conflicts required when new clients seek representation
by the firm is also required on another occasion. Any change in lawyer
personnel, whether by hire, merger, spinoff, or dissolution, requires
adjustments to the current- and former-client lists. Lawyers hired from other
firms should bring with them complete lists of former clients, including those
represented by other lawyers at their old firms. The firm should follow the
same procedures in hiring nonlawyer personnel, including law clerks,
paralegals, and secretaries and investigators who have previously worked for
lawyers.59
Once detected, potential conflicts need further examination by a team of
lawyers well versed in the nuances of relevant legal regulation concerning
former-client conflicts. The team should examine at least three issues in every
instance. 6
First, the reviewers should establish the exact scope of the prior represen-
tation. Most courts, but not all,61 have adopted the peripheral-representation
rule, which allows a lawyer to rebut the presumption of receipt of confidential
information by showing that the lawyer in fact had no access to confidences
during the prior representation.62 Such an argument is plausible when the
lawyer had no contact with the former client other than vicariously through her
firm.63 The argument is also plausible when the lawyer actually worked on
a former-client matter, but in a limited way, such as performing legal research
without access to a client's file.'
Second, if the prior representation was more than peripheral, the
59. For cases where secretaries or office managers subjected an attorney or firm to review for
disqualification, see Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0 Enters., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ill.
1985); Herron v. Jones, 637 S.W.2d 569 (Ark. 1982); Esquire Care, Inc. v. Maguire, 532 So.2d
740 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Lackow v. Walter E. Heller & Co. Southeast, Inc., 466 So. 2d
1120 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); King v. King, App. No. 89-46-1I, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS
675, 1989 WL 122981 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 1989).
For cases where paralegals brought scrutiny upon an attorney or firm regarding a motion
to disqualify, see Rivera v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., No. 51-63-64, 1991 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 1832, 1991 WL 151892 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1991); In re Opinion No. 24 of the
Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 607 A.2d 962 (N.J. 1992); Glover Bottled Gas
Corp. v. Circle M. Beverage Barn, Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 440 (App. Div. 1987).
60. The firm should retain the former-client lists for conflict-of-interestchecks as new clients
seek representation.
61. See, e.g., State ex rel. FirsTier Bank, N.A. v. Buckley, 503 N.W.2d 838, 844 (Neb.
1993).
62. See, e.g., W.L. Gore &Assocs., Inc. v. InternationalMed. Prosthetics ResearchAssocs.,
Inc., 745 F.2d 1463, 1467 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
63. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751,756-
57 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'g 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
64. See id.
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reviewers should compare the factual and legal nature of the prior representa-
tion to that of the current matter. The former client's confidences are at risk
only in substantially related' matters. Because dozens of cases have
discussed the scope of "substantial relationship," a firm with a potential
conflict must very carefully conduct a jurisdiction-specific legal and factual
review. 
6
Third, if the prior representation was more than peripheral and the
matters appear substantially related, the reviewing attorneys must consider the
possibility of former-client consent and the conditions of that consent. Fire
walls designed to prevent disclosure of former-client confidences may prove
acceptable to either the former client or a court. Because the entire firm's
loyalty is no longer an issue, the screen can be limited to those lawyers who
had access to the former client's confidences. If promptly erected and
adequately maintained, fire walls in the case of former-client confidences
prevent professional sanctions if the former client knowingly consents to the
details of the screen. Former clients and firms are therefore free to bargain
for a fire wall as a condition of consent to the adverse representation.'
In no reported case has a court refused to allow a screen to which the
former client has consented. The majority of lawyers, who practice in
anti-screen jurisdictions, therefore need to understand the function of screens
in order to bargain for and establish adequate consensual screens. Those
lawyers in more liberal jurisdictions that allow screens without client consent
need to understand the judicial requirements imposed on such screens. Thus,
every lawyer needs to understand how to establish, maintain, and monitor a
fire wall.
The viability of a fire wall depends on the nature of the past representa-
tion and the manner in which the wall is established and monitored. One of
the most important factors is law firm structure. In general, larger size and
greater departmentalization offer the best physical environment in which to
erect a fire wall. Large departmentalized firms are much better able to
physically isolate a specialized lawyer in a separate department or floor.68
Smaller firm lawyers, on the other hand, often assume a number of roles and
interact more informally in their firms.69 And since successful fire walls
65. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
66. See WOLFRAM, supra note 23, § 7.4.3, at 370-71.
67. See, e.g., CelaneseCorp. v. Leesona Corp. (Inre Yam Processing Patent Validity Litig.),
530 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1976). Occasionally, courts will imply consent if the motion to disqualify
is made long after the underlying facts became apparent. See Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 847 F.2d 725 (1 lth Cir. 1988). But see Baird v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 771 F. Supp. 24, 28
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that laches is generally not a defense to a disqualification motion).
68. See, e.g., INA Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Rubin, 635 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
69. See Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1058 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other
grounds, 450 U.S. 903, dismissed, 659 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1981) (table decision); Yaretsky v.
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presume the ability to preclude persons from sharing information, it is
impossible to accept the idea that one person "can erect a Chinese Wall down
the middle of his forehead."7"
There are several requirements for a viable fire wall. First, for a fire
wall to work, all attorneys and support staff in the firm must be initially
informed of its existence.7 Next, the wall must include physical separation
of files,' allowing access to screened cases on a need-to-know basis only.
Special attention to secret codes in computer databases is necessary. Further,
the screened lawyer must not share in the fees from the matter.73 Finally, the
firm should physically separate screened lawyers from the rest of the firm,
whether within a practice area or in separate practice areas. 74
Once an adequate screen is established, it will need to be monitored until
it is disassembled. A screen could be disassembled if the former client
consents or if the firm can establish that the prior representation was either
peripheral or not substantially related to the current representation.75 In all
other cases, the firm must monitor its screens for as long as the adverse
representation continues, often years. Adequate monitoring includes continual
reminders such as signs or tags on paper and computer files as well as on the
office doors or walls of screened lawyers. To guard against inadvertent leaks
Blum, 525 F. Supp. 24, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
70. Insider Trading Problems May Arisefor Institutional Investors, Smythe Cautions, 24 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1295 (Aug. 21, 1992). The apt quote is from Marianne
Smythe, the director of the SEC's Division of Investment Management.
71. See Rockwell Graphics Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., No. 84-C-6746, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9002, at *15, 1991 WL 127592, at *5 (N.D. 111. June 24, 1991); In re Chicago South
Shore & South Bend R.R., 101 B.R. 10, 14-15 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); Bauunternehmung v.
United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 793, 795 (Cl. Ct. 1985).
72. See United States v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231, 235-36 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811
(1990); Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 847 F.2d 725, 732 (l1th Cir. 1988); Kearns v.
Chrysler Corp., 771 F. Supp. 190 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Rockwell Graphics Sys., Inc., 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9002, at *15, 1991 WL 127592, at *5; In re Chicago South Shore & South Bend
R.R., 101 B.R. at 15; Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, 632 F. Supp. 418, 429 (D. Del. 1986);
Rowley v. Waterfront Airways, 493 N.Y.S.2d 828 (App. Div. 1985).
73. See Cox, 847 F.2d at 727; Dugar v. Board of Educ., No. 92-C-1621, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8650, at *19, 1992 WL 142302, at *7 (N.D. I11. June 18, 1992).
74. See United States ex rel. Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pacific Constr. Corp., 637 F. Supp.
1556, 1566 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (screened attorney was only "of counsel"); Jenson v. Touche
Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720, 732 (Minn. 1983) (screened attorney was only "of counsel");
Doty & Powers, supra note 38, at 178.
75. See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1577-79 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), rev'g
Nos. 73-191-TUC-WCF & 73-212-TUC-JAW, 1974 WL 919 (D. Ariz. Aug. 28, 1974) (also
available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), cert. denied sub nom. Shell Oil Co. v. Gas-A-
Tron, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129-30 (5th
Cir. 1971); Silver Chrysler Plymouth Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), aft'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
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of information, informal firm meetings on screened cases may need to be
abandoned in favor of formal meetings with attendance noted.
Another way to monitor fire walls is suggested by securities firms, which
keep records of all meetings and phone calls between screened brokers and
employees working on the screened matters. This will remind both groups
that, even if contact is appropriate for other purposes, complete records must
be kept to document the date, duration, and content of each contact.76
Equally important, but easily overlooked, are informal contacts between
lawyers over lunch, at parties, or in elevators, corridors, or rest rooms in the
firm. The inadvertent remark when a lawyer's guard is down may pass
significant information rather innocently. 7 Requiring screened firm members
to account for the date, time, and place of each such contact may be necessary
to establish adequate monitoring.
Because these procedures are cumbersome and might not prevent
intentional' or inadvertent leaks, law firms may also be required to audit
their own compliance on a periodic basis. 79  This task will require the
establishment of a firm-wide compliance department, perhaps an ethics
committee or branch of a management committee."° Adequate control may
require a firm to hire full-time compliance personnel.
The compliance department should periodically review both the physical
structure of the screens and the records of contact with screened lawyers to
assure that no leaks have occurred. The firm should establish policies and
procedures that encourage disclosure of leaks and give the department
authority to discipline those who fail to comply with screening mechanisms.
Finally, the department should provide continuing professional education that
informs firm members of policies regarding conflicts checks and establishing
and maintaining screens.81 The firm should give special attention to new
employees and those in sensitive areas, and it should require all lawyers to
attend training sessions that update and reinforce applicable law and firm
policy.
A legal environment that accepts the use of fire walls does not necessarily
guarantee their risk-free adoption and use. Once allowed, screens proliferate.
76. Doty & Powers, supra note 38, at 178.
77. Lawrence J. Fox, The Ethics of Conflicts: Are There Any?, AM. LAw., Mar. 1993,
Special Corporate Counsel Section, at 41, 48.
78. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), aff'g in
part and rev'g in part Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D.
Ill.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); In re Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union
#107, 86 B.R. 404 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
79. See Doty & Powers, supra note 38, at 178-79.
80. See Robert E. O'Malley, Preventing Legal Malpractice in Large Law Firms, 20 U. TOL.
L. REV. 325, 361-63 (1989).
81. See Doty & Powers, supra note 38, at 179.
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With even a few lateral hires, a firm of 100 lawyers could easily generate
dozens, or even hundreds, of screens. Unless screened lawyers somehow
avoid all communication with the rest of the firm, the danger of inadvertent
disclosure of confidential information is ever present.
B. External Enforcement
Screening has developed into a complex science in other contexts in which
the failure to screen can result in civil or criminal sanctions. Law firms, on
the other hand, have been relatively free of such sanctions, concerning
themselves instead with the dilemmas created by disqualification motions.
Law firms should realize, however, that both tort liability and disciplinary
sanctions also lurk as potential pitfalls for the unprepared law firm.
Former clients who establish that a fire wall is not viable-or worse, has
leaked-can maintain tort suits based on breach of fiduciary duty for any
damages caused by the misuse of confidences.8n If the matter is before a
court, the former client also can successfully seek the disqualification of the
firm from its representation of the opposing client.8 3 Former clients whose
confidences are at risk, even in nonlitigated matters, may seek injunctive relief
to prevent the firm from representing a client with adverse interests." If the
firm is disqualified, the current client must seek new counsel. Absent prior
consent to this risk, that client may also seek damages for breach of fiduciary
duty. Typical damages are partial or total recovery of fees paid.8
In deciding disqualification matters, courts rely on various rules of
professional ethics.86 Violation of these standards additionally creates the
potential for disciplinary sanctions which can range from private censure to
disbarment.87 And some governmental agencies have attempted to regulate
the behavior of attorneys who practice before them as well. 8
The most effective sanction, however, is no doubt the criminal penalty.
Although no criminal penalties currently exist to punish leaks in law firm fire
82. See Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992), rev'g
572 A.2d 737 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
83. See T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
84. See Maritrans GP Inc., 602 A.2d at 1286-88.
85. See Silbiger v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 180 F.2d 917, 920 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 813, and cert. denied, 340 U.S. 831 (1950); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 536
A.2d 243, 252 (N.J. 1988).
86. See WOLFRAM, supra note 23, § 7.1.7, at 328-29, 332-33.
87. See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1993). An example of
a case in which disciplinary sanctions were imposed is In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Vaughn S. Conway, 301 N.W.2d 253 (Wis. 1981).
88. See WOLFRAM, supra note 23, at § 3.6.2.
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walls, they easily could be established, and not only for individual lawyers.
Professor Schneyer recently has urged vicarious liability for law firms where
ethics rules "implicate centralized firm functions, such as rules dealing with
the handling of client funds, files and property."89 Analogizing to the
regulation of corporate crime, he also argues that finding a law firm
vicariously liable for a ethical violation "would enable a court or agency to
impose discipline even when it cannot practically determine who committed
the underlying offense or it is reluctant to proceed against specific lawyers
because such action would amount to scapegoating. '" The scheme might
recognize a defense to vicarious liability modeled on the "due diligence"
defense built into the Securities and Exchange Commission's disciplinary
system for broker-dealers." Imposition of vicarious criminal liability and
recognition of the due-diligence defense would drastically speed the adoption
of monitoring techniques by law firms.
Schneyer argues that these measures are necessary to respond to the
"increasingly bureaucratic nature of law firm governance."' Although his
suggestions may seem a remote possibility today, they have already become
the basis for one bar committee's recommendation that poor conflict checking
procedures be grounds for law firm discipline. 3 There is also good reason
to doubt lawyers' objectivity in evaluating the effectiveness of current
sanctions to deter former-client conflicts. As Professor Rhode so trenchantly
put it: "[A]ttomeys readily concede in other contexts [that] disinterested
evaluation is impossible where the decisionmaker's status, income, and
self-image turn on the result."'
One thing is clear: market growth in other businesses has sometimes
attracted strong regulatory responses. It seems prudent not to discount this
possibility for law firms as well.
IV. ETHICAL REPRISE: A MOVE TO SMALLER FIRMS?
The cacophony of regulatory response is only one of at least two potential
responses to the market crescendo. Dissatisfied with the possibility or reality
of regulating fire walls, law firms may turn their attention to part of the
underlying problem-law firm size-as another way of ameliorating the
89. Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firns?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 27
(1991).
90. Id. at 28.
91. Id. at 29.
92. Id. at45.
93. See The Comm. on Professional Responsibility of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
N.Y., Discipline of Law Firms, 48 REC. ASS'N B. CrrY N.Y. 623, 639-40 (1993).
94. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589, 641
(1985).
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problem of conflict of interest.
The risk of conflict between current and former clients can be reduced,
but not eliminated, by sizing down and by avoiding mergers and lateral hires.
For firms that do not fall below fifty lawyers in size, screens may remain
available to ameliorate former-client conflicts.' Lawyers who take this
alternative seriously will still be able to serve the needs of large clients with
multifarious demands, as long as they respond creatively to their client's
needs.
Palay and Galanter suggest that lawyers could even be forced to work
alone or in small groups and still maintain their personal specialization much
as today's boutiques do.' Corporate clients would probably have more done
by in-house counsel, who represent only one client.' Lawyers wanting to
provide a full menu of legal services could join networks or affiliation groups
that link their clients to other lawyers for other services.98 Brokers might
even be used to guide clients to qualified lawyers in the network. Lawyers
could also enlarge their service potential by relying more on "almost" lawyers
such as paralegals" and by contracting out more routine tasks. 100 Insofar
as these options reduce the opportunities to share confidences, they reduce the
problem of taint and the need for screens.
Would these changes offer any benefits? Consider first the social utility
of smaller law firms. Assuming that they could creatively network so as to
provide efficient service, 10 1 will any other change be detectable?
Less legal bureaucracy may obviate the need for additional law firm
regulation such as the kind Schneyer suggests. Forcing corporate clients to
use a network of separate lawyers rather than one large firm may also limit
their ability to manipulate the legal system against a less wealthy opponent.
The current state of the profession "accentuat[es] the advantages of those able
to invest in continuous service, advance planning, long term strategy and large
manoeuvres."102
95. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
96. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 3, at 125.
97. Id. at 132.
98. Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, The Many Futures of the Big Law Firm, 45 S.C. L. REv
905, 921 (1994).
99. But see cases cited supra note 59 and Kelly A. Randall, Note, Do Your Clients'
Confidences Go Out the Window When Your Employees Go Out the Door?, 42 HASTnNGS L.J.
1667 (1991), for ethical issues raised by the use of support staff.
100. Galanter & Palay, supra note 98, at 922; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356 (1988); Marshall J. Breger, Disqualificationfor
Conflicts of Interest and the Legal Aid Attorney, 62 B.U. L. REv. 1115, 1157-1160 (1982).
101. Gilson and Mnookin argue that economies of scale can be achieved by firms "much
smaller than today's large law firms." Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 6, at 317.
102. Marc Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary United States, in
THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS 152, 172 (Robert Dingwall & Philip Lewis eds., 1983).
19941
19
Martyn: Visions of the Eternal Law Firm: The Future of Law Firm Screens
Published by Scholar Commons, 1993
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Smaller working units also remove the force of a large group ethic
enforced through hierarchical governance." 3 This could have positive or
negative effects, depending on the ideology of the hierarchy." Organiza-
tions managed by those who value and reward compliance with ethics rules
have a great deal of power to encourage and promote appropriate behavior.
Management that ignores ethics rules, however, risks apathy or positive
reinforcement of their violation. The latter is especially likely when some
other goal of the organization, such as profit or a desire to win, conflicts with
ethical obligations. It may also be more likely in firms that put business
managers rather than ethicists in charge of management.
Structural pressures such as these will only be reversed by the fear of
larger catastrophes created in an attempt to maximize short-term gains. 1 5
Faced with an internal norm to add clients or billable hours and the absence
of any enforced conflict-of-interest rules, lawyers could easily fall into the trap
of inadvertent violation of ethical obligations. Managers of a firm who wish
to avoid such a result must do more than pay lip service to ethical rules.
Neglect, even if benign, can too easily foster short-term economic benefit
maximization at the expense of long-term risk avoidance.
Professor Lisa Lerman's recent study of the billing practices of large
firms provides a good example of how law firm atmosphere can foster
unethical behavior. Faced with demands for increasing numbers of billable
hours and apparently wealthy clients who they thought would not notice,
lawyers found it easy and unobjectionable to pad billable time."°
Additional insight into the relationship between law firm size and
increased risk of unethical behavior requires further scrutiny of the training
and incentives given to different groups of lawyers within firms. For
example, recent data concerning young lawyers indicate that they express four
major concerns about their employment: communication within a firm,
professional-life-versus-personal-life issues, the need to do more pro bono
work, and equal treatment." 7 Most of these concerns seem to reflect
Litigation discovery is one area where large firms seem to have an advantage over small firms
and sole practitioners. See INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRcurr 28 (1991).
103. See Alan S. Waterman, Psychological Individualism and Organizational Functioning: A
Cost-Benefit Analysis, in ORGANIZATIONS AND ETHICAL INDIVIDUALISM 19, 41-42 (Konstantin
Kolenda ed., 1988).
104. BARBARA CZARNIAWSKA-JOERGES, IDEOLOGICAL CONTROL IN NONIDEOLOGICAL
ORGANIZATIONS 123-24 (1988).
105. As early as 1964, one study of large-firm lawyers noted that the conflicts rules were
sometimes misunderstood and fairly often breached in practice. See Note, Unchanged Rules in
Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-firm Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058
(1964).
106. See Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 659, 709-14 (1990).
107. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 3, at 128; AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE REPORT OF
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lawyers' perceived lack of control over their professional lives.1"' The pro
bono need suggests another theme. Young lawyers have been more systemati-
cally educated about professional responsibility issues than have their seniors.
If left in smaller groups with greater control over their own destinies, those
young lawyers may be able to develop creative strategies for solving ethical
problems.
While it is no doubt true that negative workplace environments stress
lawyers," 9 who as a result may offer less reliable advocacy, it remains to
be seen what the same lawyers would do on their own. Smaller firms may
offer hope for a higher quality of life. They do not guarantee, however, that
left alone, lawyers will work less or care more.
Smaller firms may or may not dampen the excessively materialistic goals
of some large-firm lawyers." 0 A decreased emphasis on extreme profit,
regardless of firm size, should encourage more humane working environments,
including those that allow personal trade-offs in lifestyle."' And lawyers
who choose smaller working units will doubtless be less able to hide in an
institution whose organization acts to absorb individuals into a corporate ethic.
Such lawyers will necessarily take more responsibility for their own actions
because they govern themselves.1 2  The character of those actions will
depend on the integrity and training of those lawyers.
The few completed behavioral studies of lawyers offer tentative factors
that predict a lawyer's compliance with ethics rules. Jerome Carlin conducted
a study of New York lawyers and concluded: "Adherence to ethical norms,
then, is a product of both inner disposition, which is more or less evenly
distributed in the bar, and situational controls .... ""s His work also
AT THE BREAKING POINT, A NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE EMERGING CRISIS IN THE
QUALITY OF LAWYERS' HEALTH AND LivEs-ITS IMPACT ON LAW FIRMS AND CLIENT SERVICES
27 (1991). And for a discussion of how firms attempt to define their roles in society, see
generally Jack L. Sammons, Jr. & Linda H. Edwards, Honoring The Law in Communities of
Force: Terrell and Wildman's Teleology of Practice, 41 EMORY L.J. 489 (1992).
108. See Amee McKim, Comment, The Lawyer Track: The Case for Humanizing the Career
Within a Large Law Firm, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 176 (1994).
109. See YOUNG LAWYERS' DIV., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE STATE OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: 1990 56, 80 (1991).
110. See generally Judith L. Maute, Balanced Lives in a Stressful Profession: An Impossible
Dream?, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 797 (1992). Many of the most successful new firms in recent
years have been led by senior partners who subordinated personal gain to the firm's development.
See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 6, at 388-89 (citing Steven Brill, Leadership, AM. LAW.,
Sept. 1983, at 18).
111. See John Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1021,
1045 (1983); GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 3, at 127-129.
112. See Leubsdorf, supra note 111, at 1045; cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 5.2 (1993).
113. JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 148
(1966). This study was an outgrowth of an earlier Carlin study of Chicago lawyers. See JEROME
19941
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suggests that lawyers tend to adopt the moral values of their clients.)2 4
Heinz and Laumann's more recent study of the Chicago bar confirms this
observation. 115
Small firms are as affected by external market pressures as large firms,
but today they have several new weapons in their arsenals to ameliorate the
effects of those pressures. Lawyers can advertise to find business 16 and in
many jurisdictions can receive a proportion of a client's fee for referring the
client to another lawyer." 7 Small firms also lack some of the internal
pressures of the "tournament" created by partnership structure,"' and, given
their size, are less likely to encounter potential conflicts.
Heinz and Laumann found that large-firm lawyers tend to rely on smaller
client bases than their small-firm colleagues." 9 Thus, to the extent that
small firms do not depend heavily on any given client, the loss of a few
potential clients due to conflicts should not be as disastrous for small firms as
for large firms.
The fact that large-firm lawyers spend more time on fewer clients suggests
a final area for attention: the effect that clients have on lawyers. Because all
lawyers advocate to some degree, they often seek to reduce personal
dissonance by adopting the viewpoint of those clients upon whom they most
depend. If smaller units of lawyers bring with them a greater diversification
of their client bases, the bar as a whole may have an opportunity for renewed
independence.
V. CONCLUSION
The exponential growth of large law firms has brought with it an
exponential increase in the potential for conflicts of interest. Large law firms
argue that fire walls should be allowed as safe harbors against the use of
former-client confidences. Some courts have agreed with this approach, but
very little thinking has been done about its long-term consequences.
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116. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988), rev'g 726 S.W.2d 299 (Ky.
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Faced with the specter of greater regulation, perhaps including criminal
sanctions, lawyers can choose to limit liability in two ways. Some may opt
for elaborate monitoring techniques that may support a due-diligence defense
to liability. Others may prefer, or may be forced by court decision, to address
a significant part of the underlying problem: law firm size.
If large firms become worried enough about the problem of regulatory
cacophony, they may choose to size down or split up as means of avoiding
conflicts of interest. Smaller law firms may offer potential for creative
marketing, better quality of life for lawyers, and renewed lawyer professional-
ism in client service.
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